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Despite efforts of Parliament; the Home Office; police forces and health practitioners, the number of 
people detained under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 continues to rise.  
By analysing quantitative data from Hampshire Constabulary this study describes in detail police 
engagement with the mentally ill. 
Findings showed how people in mental crisis were increasingly detained by the ambulance service using 
the Mental Capacity Act and taken to A&E Departments. Nationally Police officers were also found to be 
increasingly taking Section 136 detainees to A&E.  
The majority of people contacting Hampshire displayed delusions which were unlikely to result in a 
police response and may disproportionately account for the overall growth in contact with the police. 
The data suggests that ‘Triage’ schemes alone will not be effective in reducing detentions. Hampshire’s 
partnership and discretionary approach is successful in reducing detentions.  




Mental illness is unusual amongst medical conditions for it is one of the few where people can be 




have a legal or administrative system to manage and oversee such processes of detention and 
treatment and whilst the legal, cultural and medical processes vary, all seek to balance three distinct 
sets of interests (Salize, Dreßing and Peitz 2002). These are: 
• The human and other rights of the patient. 
• Public safety. 
• The efficacious treatment of the patient. 
Over the last century the approach of many ‘first world’ countries to the care of the mentally ill has 
changed significantly and dramatically since the nineteen sixties, generally moving from institutional 
based provision to more personalised support of individuals in their own communities. Reducing the 
frequency of their compulsory admission and treatment had been an aim of this change across the 
world (Curran 1978). However one perverse outcome has been increasing rates of compulsory 
treatment in many European countries  (Salize, Dreßing and Peitz 2002; de Stefano and Ducci 2008) 
including England (Wall et al. 1999). Whilst one of the intentions of United Kingdom (UK) government 
policy in moving from institutional to community care was to prevent unnecessary detention and 
treatment, latterly public fear of the harm that the mentally ill may cause has led to a policy shift which 
focuses more on public safety (Angermeyer and Matschinger 1995; Phelan and Link 1998) as seen most 
recently in the Mental Health Act 2007 (MHA)ii. This introduced supervised community treatment such 
as Community Treatment Orders (CTOs) which enables a patient to be returned to hospital and forcibly 
medicated if they do not comply with the requirements of their treatment order. It also changed the 
‘treatability test’ for detention which previously required that a treatment must be likely to alleviate or 
prevent a deterioration of condition to an ‘appropriate treatment’ test which is less stringent in that a 
"medical treatment the purpose of which is to alleviate, or prevent a worsening of, the disorder or one or 




harm that could be caused by patients, rather than their treatment. Concerns have been expressed 
about the consequences of these changes (Mental Health Alliance 2012). 
Within England and Wales the legal framework for compulsory treatment lies within the MHA 1983 (as 
amended) and the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005. This paper is concerned with the detention of 
members of the public under Section 136 of the MHA 1983. 
Section 136 of the MHA 1983 states: 
(1) If a person appears to a constable to be suffering from mental disorder and to be in 
immediate need of care or control, the constable may, if he thinks it necessary to do so in the 
interests of that person or for the protection of other persons— 
(a) remove the person to a place of safety within the meaning of section 135, or 
(b) if the person is already at a place of safety within the meaning of that section, keep 
the person at that place or remove the person to another place of safety. 
(1A) The power of a constable under subsection (1) may be exercised where the mentally 
disordered person is at any place, other than— 
(a) any house, flat or room where that person, or any other person, is living, or 
(b) any yard, garden, garage or outhouse that is used in connection with the house, flat 
or room, other than one that is also used in connection with one or more other houses, 
flats or rooms. 
 
This amended version of Section 136 of the MHA which was introduced in December 2017 clarified or 
altered several aspects of the Act including widening the scope of the locations where officers could 




public places and private places where there was permitted access such as shopping centres, football 
stadia etc. The power did not apply to private places where the public are not permitted such as railway 
lines, or prohibited areas of tall buildings or structures (where suicidal people might be found). It now 
applies anywhere apart from peoples’ homes.  To promote alternatives to detention in police facilities a 
requirement was introduced for officers to consult Health professionals, usually in the form of a ‘Triage 
Scheme’, before exercising this power – “where practical”. Triage schemes operate by allowing a police 
officer who is considering using Section 136 to speak to a mental health professional (either by phone or 
in person) who can offer them advice about whether they need to make a detention. The details of such 
schemes are set out in an evaluation of nine trial Triage schemes undertaken by Reveruzzi (2016). 
The purpose of Section 136 is to enable Health professionals to make an assessment of the detained 
person to see if they are ill and if so, whether they need further detention for assessment and treatment 
(see Section 2 or 3 of Part II of the MHA 1983). The time limit for detention was also reduced from 72 
hours to 24 hours. This was intended to minimise harm to individuals and focus the attention of partners 
on speeding up the process of assessment.  However, at its heart the power for police to detain remains.  
There is a longstanding significant public disquiet about the operation of Section 136, especially around 
the rising rate of detentions and the low treatment rates that follow. A study by Keown ( 2013) using 
publicly available data to compare the period 1984/5 to 2010/11, showed a six fold increase in the use 
of Section 136 in that period. More recent public data, (see table 1), shows a continuing rise of thirty 
nine percent over five years. This is perhaps more surprising when Her Majesties Inspectorate of 
Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) reports that forty two of the forty three police 






Empirical research has indicated that the growth in police use of Section 136 has also been accompanied 
by a change in the pattern of behaviours of those who are subsequently detained. Thirty years ago the 
majority of behaviours resulting in detention were violent, abusive, aggressive or disturbing (Bean et al. 
1991; Turner, Ness and Imison 1992; Simmons and Hoar 2001) whilst most recently the majority of 
behaviours resulting in detention has concerned threats of self-harm (Thomas and Forrester-Jones 
2018). These changes in both the volume of detention and in behaviour leading to detention have also 
appeared to coincide with a decline in treatment rates following detention. It is proposed by Thomas 
and Forrester-Jones ( 2018) that all three effects were caused by the emergence of a ‘risk averse’ culture 
amongst police officers which resulted in them detaining people to prevent any possibility of blame for 
harm attaching to officers.  
Wide differences in the rate of detention and treatment by Health Authority area have also been 
reported, most recently through NHS Digital (NHS Digital 2018). In this the rate varied from 6 to 116 
detentions per 100,000 residents.  Weich et al. ( 2014) set out to determine whether these differences 
in admission and treatment rates could be accounted for by socioeconomic or sociodemographic factors 
or features of the delivery of local mental health services. Using multi-level statistical models to examine 
the Mental Health Minimum Data Set for the year 2010/11, which included just over 1.2 million patient 
records, they found that 84% of the variation lay between individuals on the basis of personal factors 
such as age, gender and race. However, statistically significant variations also arose between local areas 
and Health Trusts. The authors concluded that different policies and budget levels between Health 
Authorities may account for a significant part of the differences in detention and treatment rates. It is 
not clear how such differences influence the actions of officers making Section 136 detentions. 
The rate of Section 136 detention per 100,000 residents for Forces in England and Wales is shown in Fig 
1 belowiii. There is a tenfold difference between the highest and lowest values and even allowing for 




neighbouring forces, which presumably share social and demographic factors, are near each other in the 
chart such as Cambridgeshire, Norfolk and Suffolk or Avon and Somerset and Devon and Cornwall, other 
forces that are neighbours are widely separated such as Kent and Essex, or Dorset and Wiltshire. Even in 
the Police groupings of most similar forcesiv the spread is wide e.g. In one such group the rankings are 
Kent 2nd; Sussex 6th; Avon and Somerset 7th; Essex 11th; Staffordshire 12th; Hertfordshire 29th; 
Hampshire 35th and Derbyshire 39th. It is not clear why or how such variations arise and differences in 
NHS structures and models of policing may also play a part. The aim of this study was therefore to 
investigate in more detail the police engagement with people who are mentally ill to further understand 
the origins of such differences. Within available resources a single force study was most practical and 
Hampshire Constabulary agreed to participate. 
Figure one. 
A favourable ethical opinion for the research was obtained through the Ethics Committee of the School 
of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Science at the University of Kent. And the study was undertaken 
with the cooperation and written consent of the Hampshire Constabulary. The research was also 
compliant with the General Data Protection Regulations and other Force policies of Hampshire 
Constabulary. 
Method. 
The study took place within Hampshire Constabulary a large provincial police force in England. It consists 
of two urban areas which are Unitary authorities, Southampton and Portsmouth. The two-tier County of 
Hampshire and the Unitary authority of the Isle of Wight (IOW).  
This research used quantative methods to analyse Force Control Room (FCR) data. The data was 
collected in 2017 and records from the full year of 2016 were analysed. The study was in two parts. In 




provided a limited opportunity for analysis. In the second, analysis of the content of the incident records 
was employed. On this basis a more detailed analysis could be undertaken, however there are 
limitations to this approach given the uncertain process by which the record is derived from the actual 
incident.  Each incident was summarised and categorised using an Excel spreadsheet and the analysis 
undertaken using filters and formulas. 
In this study less than 1% of reported incidents arose through members of the public contacting police 
stations in person or by direct contact with patrolling police officers. The overwhelming majority of 
incidents were generated as a result of a telephone call. 
Calls to the police can arrive through the 999 system or through non urgent contact numbers such as 
‘101’. After passing through the switchboard the calls are handled by the call takers within the FCR. Here 
in principle every phone contact is recorded and creates a record. In practice this is not always so. Some 
incidents such as collisions on the motorways may generate hundreds of calls with the result that for 
repeat calls containing no new information, a record of the caller may not be created. Other calls may 
be forwarded to other units such as the crime management units and so a record will not be made in 
the FCR. 
When an incident is created the call-handler is led through a process of completing a record on the force 
‘command and control’ system. This includes details of the caller, a description of the incident and if the 
caller or location is recorded on an existing record then this is drawn to the attention of the call handler. 
This links together potentially related incidents. In addition, an ‘incident type’ is attached to it which 
takes the form of an opening code and describes the key feature of the call. There are a wide range of 
these for example it could be about a burglary, so the opening code would be “BURINC”. 
The incident may require no further action by the force; some action by the force on the phone for 




the incident. The record of the incident also contains this outcome from the person who resolved it and 
then a ‘closing code’ or codes which classify the incident. The closing codes may be different from the 
opening code. The closing code is generally seen as a more accurate record of the type of incident.  
Four codes were identified as likely to be relevant in research about contact from or about people who 
were mentally ill. The opening code of “VUNBLEINC“   which is used to denote an incident concerning a 
person who is vulnerable. The opening code “CONWELF” identifies an incident which raises concerns 
about the welfare or wellbeing of an individual. The closing codes of Q130 (Mental illness) or Q115 
(Persistent caller) were also reported as relevant. 
At the time of this study the only mental health Triage Scheme in Hampshire Constabulary was a scheme 
on the IOW. The Isle of Wight uniquely has a single Health trust which provides all NHS services on the 
island including the ambulance service. In this scheme a mental health worker attended police incidents 
– when available. A small number of Incidents dealt with this way and were identified through reference 
in the incident record to the scheme.  Most outcomes were also recorded there too. 
Results and discussion. 
In 2016 Hampshire Constabulary generated 433,261 command and control logs which resulted in the 
creation of 401,645 unique incidents.  
Of these, 18,320 incidents related to one or more of those first four codes. This represented a rate of 
4.6% of incidents that were concerned with mental illness. This is higher than the 0.6% reported by 
Thomas and Forrester-Jones ( 2018) but that report was only concerned with incidents where officers 
attended (This is further discussed below). The College of Policing estimated demand from mental illness 
as 2% (College of Policing 2015) whilst HMICFRS estimated 2.4% of crimes and 2.8% of incidents were 




likely to be under-reported figures. The Metropolitan Police have estimated the level of demand as 
much higher at 15 to 20% of workload (College of Policing 2015). 
To check the accuracy with which the incidents were coded, two hundred and two consecutive incidents 
on one day and two hundred or another were examined. The first set revealed nine incidents: six were 
VUNBLEINC opening codes of which five were Q130 on closing, three others were Q130 on closing.  In 
the second batch six incidents were identified of which two were opened as VUNBLEINC of which one 
was closed as Q130 and three other incidents were identified as Q130 on closing. All these seventeen 
incidents were correctly identified. In addition, three other incidents could have been classified as Q130 
on closing. This is a judgement, but it was supported by the FCR supervisor present on the days. This 
represents a potential error rate of around three quarters of one percent, which is a satisfactory rate of 
accuracy for the study. 
To determine how best to sample incidents for these codes an analysis was undertaken comparing the 
number of incidents reported by time of day, day of week and month of the year. There are no 
significant differences in reporting rates of overall and mental health incidents by day of week or month 
of year. There are a similar pattern of incidents by time of the day, as in Fig. two below.  
Figure two 
This shows proportionately more calls out of hours than during the day, but otherwise a similar 
distribution.  The implication is that by sampling whole days any time of the day effects can be 
eliminated. It was determined to analyse all the incidents relating to mental illness from one week in the 
first quarter of 2016. Those incidents which started on the seventh day but concluded on the eight were 




Searching using the four codes identified 444 incidents. The anonymized data about these incidents 
including the codes, the opening and closing description and the outcomes, where known, were entered 
into an Excel spreadsheet where they were analysed using filters and formulas. 
Of the 444, eight appeared to be mis-classified. However, one related to a man who rang to say that the 
door handle had come off his door and he was locked in his office. The call taker though he might be 
mentally ill, classified him as Vulnerable, but indeed the handle had fallen off trapping him. In a second a 
man was reported as hanging off a roof, possibly suicidal and so coded as Vulnerable, but he was a ‘free 
runner’ who was talking a rest so again an understandable classification. Three were classified as Q115 
(persistent caller) but they related to ‘take-aways’ which were frequent callers because of anti-social 
behaviour not mental illness and three were family disputes and appeared to be in error. This would 
give an error rate of around 1.8%. A fairer estimate might be to accept that the first two did appear to 
relate to mental illness or vulnerability and so the error rate should properly be six out of 444 which 
equates to 1.3%. This error rate is low and similar to that reported above. 
These incidents shared twenty-five different opening codes. These and the numbers of each can be 
aggregated as: 
• Concerns for someone’s welfare including: Vulnerable (263); concerns for welfare (67); injury 
illness (10) and missing person (13) - 352 incidents = 81% (of 437).  
• Crime including crimes; public order; drink related offending and driving and suspicious 
incidents- 57 = 13%.  
• Domestic disputes - 17 = 4%.  




The great majority of incidents reported to the police, shown here as “concerns for someone’s welfare”, 
concerned the prospect of harm to individuals. These could be reported directly by individuals or by 
third parties. 
One hundred and ninety three (44%) of these incidents had an officer or PCSO deployed to it and of 
these deployments: 
• 155 (78%) were by the police,  
• 24 (12%) were initially the police who handed the incident over to an ambulance.  
• 11 (5%) were deployed to by ambulance alone (but the police were notified).  
• 8 (4%) started with the ambulance but was passed to the police.  
• 1 (0.5%) incident was passed from the police to NHS direct on 111. 
Whilst this list reflects the ‘cross-over’ between the police and ambulance services, there would also 
have been a number of calls to the ambulance service alone, concerning crises of mental illness, which 
are not reported here. Police handing incidents to the ambulance service was not observed in a previous 
study though incidents passed from ambulance to police through delays in ambulance attendance was 
observed (Thomas and Forrester-Jones 2018). 
Two hundred and forty three (56%) of incidents were dealt with no deployment, either through the 
initial conversation by the call taker or a follow up conversation on the telephone with that person or 
someone else.  If this is representative of the eighteen thousand recorded mental health incidents, then 
the rate of deployment to such incidents falls to 2.5% which is more consistent with previous estimates 
of demand upon the police (above). 
Seventy four (17%) of the calls came from other public sector partners such as the ambulance service, 
care homes, hospitals or doctors. This is significantly lower than the fifty percent reported previously 




sector partners, which represents sixteen percent. Differences in such partnership working is likely to 
account for some if not most of the variation in the operation use of Section 136 between forces. 
Forty six (10%) of the calls appeared to meet the criteria for the use of Section 136 in that at the 
conclusion of the incident the subject was passed into the care or custody of another party. Thus, either 
Section 136 was used, the ambulance service took the person away for assessment or the person was 
passed into the care of family friends or another authority.  In terms of the behaviour of the individual: 
• In thirty four of the incidents there were threats of self-harm;  
• in five the subject appeared to be having a psychotic episode; 
• In four through their behaviour they appeared very vulnerable to harm;  
• In two the subject appeared extremely distressed;  
• In one the subject exhibited irrational violent and aggressive behaviour. 
Thus in 83% of these incidents the person was threatening self-harm or otherwise appeared likely to 
come to harm. This figure is consistent with the 81% of behaviour leading to Section 136 detention 
concerning self-harm (Thomas and Forrester-Jones 2018). 
In terms of outcomes: 
• Officers detained people under Section 136 on ten occasions (but in one the ambulance agreed 
to take the person detained to hospital). 
• On ten occasions an ambulance took the person to hospital using their powers under Section 4 
and 5 of the Mental Capacity Act  
• On five the police left the subject with family members waiting for an ambulance  
• On eleven occasions the person was left with family members to care for them 
• On one the police returned a patient to his treatment unit 




• On one occasion police officers took the person to hospital 
• On four occasions the IOW Triage Scheme dealt with the person (one taken home; one no 
further action; one an appointment made and the forth not know) 
• One person was arrested on a criminal warrant 
• One was handed to the military authorities to care for them 
• One was referred to their GP 
• One person was dealt with informally (taken to a hotel and booked in overnight) 
The outcomes can thus be summarised as: 
• No detentions were taken into police custody. 
• Nine Section 136 detentions by the police were taken to a Health Based Place of Safety using a 
private secure ambulance service.v 
• Eighteen detentions went to hospital directly. Sixteen by ambulance, one taken by family and 
one directly by police officers. 
• Eleven individuals were cared for by family members. 
• Two were dealt with by other Health bodies. 
• Two were passed to other responsible authorities. 
• One was dealt with informally 
• One was No Further Action (through IOW Triage Scheme). 
• One not known (through IOW Triage Scheme) 
So, whilst twenty percent of these detentions went to a mental health unit for assessment, forty one 
percent went to A&E in hospital – usually by ambulance. Detentions by ambulance staff taken to 
hospital would not appear in the police figures quoted above but an increase in police Section 136 





The growth in use of Accident and Emergency in table two relates to police officers taking detainees 
there. This may well result in the officers having to remain to supervise their detainee until the 
assessment is complete or even until a suitable bed is found to admit them. The recent advice published 
by the Royal College of Emergency Medicine (The Royal College of Emergency Medicine 2017) states 
that police officers arriving with someone detained under Section 136 should be required to stay with 
the detainee unless the ‘hospital has staff and space to safely take responsibility for detention and 
agrees to do so’ The Royal College of Psychiatrists in their guidance also state that officers may need to 
remain at the POS for ‘a short period’ (The Royal College of Psychiatrists 2011). Though in their later 
guidance the Royal College had set the time limit at 30 minutes (The Royal College of Psychiatrists 2013) 
It therefore seems likely that in many cases officers will be required to stay and supervise the person 
they detained.  When taken to hospital by ambulance the responsibility for supervision would fall on 
ambulance or hospital staff which in turn could cause significant problems for Health as one detainee 
may require two or even three staff to supervise them whilst in A&E. It is not desirable to take detainees 
to A&E unless they have a specific facility for as a POS. This was set out in the report of the Royal College 
of Psychiatrists (the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the British Association for Accident and 
Emergency Medicine 1996) and expanded upon by Lynch ( 2002), though lack of capacity may make A&E 
a POS of last resort. 
In Hampshire Constabulary the number of recorded Section 136 detentions are falling. In 2015/16 there 
were 692, in 2016/17 there were 713, whilst in 2017/18 there were 543. The projection for 2018/19 is 
366. This may arise from a number of sources. When this data was collected the only operational Triage 
Scheme was a ‘Street Triage’ scheme on the Isle of Wight whilst now, they are more extensive and 
operate in partnership with the ambulance service. As the fall in number of detentions predates the 




for the fall. The Force has published policies which encourage officers and staff to use their discretion in 
dealing with such (and other) incidents and they state they have effective arrangements in their 
partnership with the Ambulance Service which has resulted in them taking responsibility for a larger 
proportion of such mental health emergencies. As most forces have Triage Schemes in place and yet the 
number of detentions nationally continue to rise, the implication is that Triage Schemes in themselves 
are not sufficient to reduce the number of Section 136 detentions. Triage Schemes in combination with 
better working practices with ambulance services and other Health partners and more discretion 
exercised by officers especially in involving family and friends in caring for those in crisis appear to offer 
the best prospects. 
In addition to the 46 Section 136 ‘type’ incidents there were 147 other mental health incidents that 
officers were deployed to. The behaviour in these two types of deployment were quite different. Whilst 
eighty nine percent of the Section 136 incidents related to threat of self-harm, this was only present in 
only fifty five percent of other deployments. This was reversed for crime and domestic disputes which 
were thirty one and eleven percent of other deployments and only nine and two percent of Section 136 
type deployments. This is the established pattern that self-harm is the causal factor for Section 136 type 
incidents. 
It is possible on the basis of the descriptions in the police records to further categorise the incidents. 
This analysis is more cautious given that it is based on a summary account recorded in the control room, 
from an assessment provided from the scene by an ‘unqualified’ person and the numbers are quite 
small. For the forty six Section 136 type incidents these can be described thus: 
• Suicidal. 23 (50%) An attempting or direct threat of suicide. 
• Delusional. 6 (13%)  Where the perception of reality appears disturbed or distorted.vi 
• Distressed. 9 (20%) Where they are described as very distressed. 




• Attention seeking. 2 (4%) Where their purpose appears to be to get attention from the police. 
• Behaviour. 1 (2%) Difficult or uncooperative behaviour. In most cases this concerned requests 
from other organisations or carers for assistance. 
For the 147 other deployments the pattern was different. 
• Suicidal. 13 (9%).  
• Delusional. 24 (16%).  
• Distressed. 28 (19%). 
• Irrational. 19 (13%).   
• Behaviour. 28 (19%) and in addition 
• Dementia. 25 (17%) Where the person was identified as suffering from dementia. 
• Absconders. 6 (4%) These were absconders from assessment or treatment by Health. 
• Assistance. 4 (3%) Other requests for assistance from partners. 
Whilst the behaviours in ‘distressed’ or ‘irrational’ can be described it is impossible to say what the 
underlying state of mind of the subject was. In contrast in the absence of these behaviours the 
delusional nature of the subject can often easily be seen. Taken together with delusional behaviour they 
constituted forty four and forty eight percent of incidents. A similar percentage which implies that these 
behaviours were not material in the decision as to whether the person was detained under Section 136. 
That decisions was mostly determined by the level of risk of self-harm. 
Dementia resulted in deployments but none that appeared to be suitable for detention under Section 
136.  A lack of mental capacity through dementia would be more suitably dealt with using Sections 4 and 




In two hundred and forty three incidents (56%) there was no police or other attendance. These can be 
divided into two principle categories: single callers and frequent callers and then the same categories as 
above.  This comparison is set out below in table 3. 
Table 3. 
The non-deployed suicidal incident was exceptional and arose when a member of the public rang to say 
her friend was distressed and suicidal but that she had calmed her down and would look after her. Apart 
from that case, threats of suicide were deployed to by the police and high-risk cases were detained or 
often left in the care of other agencies or family members. Delusional callers who appeared ‘low risk’ 
were most often not deployed to – this is in accordance with clinical advice received by Hampshire 
Constabulary. Li et al.  ( 2018), reporting from New Zealand, analysed their increase in demand through 
mental illness. They found a similar rise in high risk threats of suicide calls but also a disproportionately 
large rise in non-deployment ‘low risk’ calls.  Their study over nine years, supports and compliments this 
work showing the growth in calls disproportionally arises through low risk calls. 
Distress or irrationality appear equally often in deployed and non-deployed incidents and so these 
behaviours do not appear to affect police actions and outcomes. 
Requests for assistance from carers because of poor behaviour most often related to Learning Disability 
or Autism and is a small but growing area of police work as was reported previously (Thomas and 
Forrester-Jones 2018). Similarly calls relating to dementia must be set to grow in volume and were 
around half of a percent of Hampshire Constabulary incidents in this study. 
Finally, there has been recent publicity about high frequency callers to police and other emergency 
services (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-43293581). This is equally true for Hampshire 
Constabulary. The top ten callers in 2016 made 6,131 calls, the top caller alone made 2,636 calls. This 




caller, but it is noticeable that the staff taking the calls were kind and courteous which may reinforce the 
behaviour. The force has local partnership meetings to discuss the care and management of such high 
frequency callers living in the community, but it is reported that it is very difficult to limit such calls. 
Conclusions. 
Detentions under Section 136 of the MHA continue to rise nationally though there are forces such as 
Hampshire Constabulary where numbers are falling. It does not appear that the presence of a Triage 
Scheme alone is sufficient to reduce the numbers of detentions. This requires effective partnership 
working, which is dependent upon the willingness of partners, and the more effective use of discretion 
by officers. The latter is under the control of forces but requires them to manage the often risk-averse 
behaviour of their own officers and staff. A useful further study would be to examine the same data in a 
force with a high detention rate using Section 136. 
The evidence in this paper offers a way for forces to assess their use of Section 136 and the 
effectiveness of their partnership working. This in turn sets out priorities for future action to reduce the 
use of Section 136 and avoid the ‘pitfalls’ above. 
The prohibition on the use of Police custody facilities for Section 136 detentions has resulted in an 
increase in detained persons being taken by officers to hospital A&E departments – presumably as a POS 
of last resort. This may become problematic and time consuming for officers and forces may wish to 
address this before the problem gets worse. 
Where the number of police detentions fall the individuals in crisis are often detained instead by the 
ambulance service, which in turn is likely to cause significant problems for them and elsewhere within 
Health such as in A&E. 
Detention, whether under Section 136 or the MCA in most cases arose from an assessment of a high risk 




have prompted police attendance but more often than not did not cause detention. It appears likely that 
a disproportionate part of the growth in calls to the police over recent years concerns people who would 
generally be described as at low risk of harm to themselves or others and who most commonly display 
delusional behaviour. High frequency callers most often exhibited delusional behaviour alone and were 
least likely to experience a police attendance. The example from Hampshire shows that careful 
assessment of risk can minimise the real time response from the police to many calls, whilst facilitating 
the multiagency management of mentally ill people in the community. 
Further research on the impact of the MCA, as used by the ambulance service and the police, and its 



















Section 136 detentions in England 















Source: As per table 1 and in addition from: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/policeforceareadatatables/current 
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Percentage of mental illness closing code incidents and 
all incidents by time of day
Closing code 130 All incidents
Year 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 
Total S136 detentions England and 
Wales 
23602 28271 26328 29662 
Detained police station 4537 2100 1029 471 
% Police station 19.2 7.4 3.9 1.6 
Health Based Places of Safety 19065 26171 20435 23414 
% HBPOS 80.8 92.6 77.6 78.9 













% Not Known 
  
9.7 7.0 




Table 3.  
Comparison of mental incident types for deployed and non-deployed incidents. 











Suicidal 50% 9%  2% 
Delusional 13% 16% 56% 29% 
Distressed 20% 19% 13% 15% 
Irrational 11% 13% 18% 22% 
Attention seeking 4%  8% 4% 
Behaviour 2% 19%  5% 
Dementia  17% 4% 18% 
Absconders  4%   
Assistance  3%   
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i The other illness subject to compulsory treatment in the UK is Tuberculosis and is through Sections 37 and 38 of 
the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 
ii Only applies in England and Wales 
iii Excludes the City of London and British Transport Police where comparisons of resident populations are 
meaningless. 
iv For full lists see https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/crime-and-policing-comparator/about-the-
data/ 
v At that time Hampshire Constabulary had a contract with MEDISEC, a private ambulance company to take all 
Section 136 detentions to a POS. The contractor has since changed but a private ambulance service is still 
employed. 
vi The Royal College of Psychiatry defines the term as the term 'delusion' to denote a pathology in which a belief 
held with unshakeable conviction runs counter to the prevailing cultural norm. 
